philosophy takes many forms, some of them riskier and more promising than others.
One reason for seeing philosophy as literature derives from our inability to separate the two -or so Peter McCormick argues in his "Philosophical Discourses and Fictional Texts." McCormick shows that neither speechact theory nor genre theory -or even some combination of the two -can establish what makes a text philosophical and not literary. McCormick's convincing analysis invites us to read "at least some philosophical texts with an eye to their fictional components" (p. 71), an invitation that Dalia Judovitz (in "Philosophy and Poetry: The Difference between Them in Plato and Descartes") and Harry Berger, Jr. , (in "Levels of Discourse in Plato's Dialogues") readily accept. Plato and Descartes are appropriate objects -I could say victims -of such an analysis because both were of course bent on purging philosophy of literary qualities. In both writers literature returns not just to haunt but to found the very texts that would exclude it. By "literature" Judovitz means such things as die dialogical format of Plato's works as well as the several metaphors, rhetorical figures, and fables at work in both Plato and Descartes. Even the latter's hyperbolic doubt, for example, uneasily depends on die rhetorical figure of hyperbole.
For Berger "literature" implies textuality, a "level" of Plato's discourse that Berger wishes to distinguish from the "dramatic" and die "thematic." Berger credits commentators like Paul Friedländer, Leo Strauss, and Stanley Rosen for attending to die dramatic structure of Plato's work, thereby seeing Socrates and his various interlocutors as characters in a dialogue, not as direct spokesmen for Plato. Aldiough advancing beyond a merely thematic or "ventriloquist" approach to Plato, these scholars, however, in different ways still claim to "recuperate die presence of the author [Plato] and to arrive at knowledge of his 'teaching" (p. 94). As in the New Criticism, dramatistic considerations complicate, but do not finally subvert, a mimetic view. By appealing to the open-ended textuality of Plato's works, Berger wants to block die "moudipiece" approach in boüi its forms -dramatic and thematic -in order to highlight what he sees as "a central theme of Platonic discourse, namely, die structural inadequacy and ediical dangers inherent in any mediod of teaching, and indeed in any institution -whemer educational, political, social, or more broadly cultural -committed to die dramatic or logocentric level of discourse and grounded in the speaking presence of institutional actors" (p. 96). Widiin this general critique, Berger finds in Plato "an especially pointed and poi- Insight, i.e., shows diat a seemingly metaphysical or logocentric writer is more self-subverting dian he first appears. Along similar lines, in "Postmodernism in Philosophy: Nostalgia for the Future, Waiting for the Past," the concluding essay in die volume, Berel Lang advises mat "where logocentrism or reification is alleged, we look for the occasion of those charges in the dramatizing eyes of die beholder, among die historians of logos, rather than in the historical texts themselves" (p. 323). For Lang, the antilogocentric or "postmodernist" longing to break widi die past and diereby end philosophy may be internal to philosophizing, even a prerequisite. Despite diese critics' distance from Derrida, Berger especially seems vulnerable to some of the objections Derridean deconstruction has triggered. I for one find it discouraging mat a critic on guard against diematic analysis can go on to identify a "central theme of Platonic discourse" in the passage already quoted. And I am not sure how Berger can earn his concluding claim that "the written dialogue [i.e., the Platonic text] represents deep-structural necessities woven dirough die speech within which die intentions of a presence who goes by the name of Socrates are sometimes, but only sometimes, inscribed" (p. 99). Even diis cautious talk of presence would seem to resurrect the "moumpiece uieory" diat Berger is at pains to bury.
But I will not press diese familiar charges here. I am more interested in Arthur C. Danto's sharp comments on recent literary dieory in "Philoso-phy as/and/of Literature," the opening essay of the volume. As Johnsonian Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University, Danto speaks from within academic philosophy, well aware of its tendency to pattern philosophy along die lines of science. From this point of view, style seems irrelevant "save to the degree that it enchances perspicuity" (p. 4); the standard literary form is the impersonal fifteen-page philosophical paper intended for a severely limited professional audience; and philosophy aims at solving well-defined problems and transmitting verifiable trudis. Regarding philosophical texts as literary seems to jeopardize dieir intellectual seriousness: it feels like a demotion to philosophers accustomed to associating philosophy with science, much as, Danto says, regarding die Bible as literature has felt like an insult to those who take it as a body of divine revelation. Danto goes on to show that the wish of some philosophers to emulate science has encouraged in semantical dieory a crude view of literature based on bloodless abstractions like "Gegenstände, intensions, fictive worlds" -"diemselves as much in need of ontological redemption as the beings to whose rescue mey were enlisted: Don Quixote, Mr. Pickwick, Gandalf die Grey" (p. 10).
According to Danto, instead of rectifying die impoverishment of literature by some philosophers, recent literary dieory exacerbates it. Danto has in mind die dieory of intertextuality, which he takes as arguing diat literary works refer not "vertically" to reality but "horizontally" to odier literary signifiers. Drawing on examples from die visual arts as well as from literature, Danto argues mat "reference to die world works togedier with references to other art, when there are such references, to make a complex representation" (p. 13). Fortunately, "extratextuality" can coexist with "intratextuality" -fortunately because from Danto's vantage point outside academic literary criticism, intratextuality by itself reduces a poem to an object of "specialist knowledge" and makes criticism a "kind of hermeneutic contortion that earns interpreters of literature distinguished chairs in universities" (p. 13). "Why," Danto righdy asks, "since not ourselves literary scholars, should we concern ourselves with diese intricate networks of reciprocal effects?" (p. 14).
Danto concludes by sketching a view of philosophy and literature diat tries to do justice to the differences as well as the similarities between die two. Put very simply here, literature and philosophy aim at universality but construe this common goal in different ways. Philosophy wants necessity as well as universality, or "truth for all worlds diat are possible" (p. 17). A literary text is universal in being "about each reader who experiences it" -in allowing each reader to discover "an unguessed dimension of the selP (pp. 18-19) while reading, much as John Stuart Mill learned that he was not a stock or a stone while reading Wordsworth. (This example is mine, not Danto's.) The differences between literature and philosophy are not stylistic or grammatical -and here Danto would agree, I think, wim McCormick -but apparendy differences in intent. Ascertaining this intent takes us beyond Danto's essay but not outside diis volume, as I will be discussing below.
Danto's essay shows how bodi philosophy and literary criticism can benefit from being brought together. While I do not want to exaggerate die completeness or novelty of Danto's remarks on literature, I mink he is explaining the right thing, namely, why "literature, certainly in its greatest exemplars, seems to have something important to do with our lives, important enough that the study of it should form an essential part of our educational program ..." (p. 10). And I would agree wim him that neither intratextuality nor "the chilling tale of fictional reference" told by semantical theorists adequately accounts for diis importance. If Danto thus provides literary critics a way of beginning to explain the significance of their subject, he gives philosophers a way of understanding philosophical texts that does not treat their literary status as "a consolation prize for failing to be true" (p. 21). For Danto, philosophical texts are literary to the extent that they exist for readers in search of the kind of selfdiscovery diat literature rewards. In the standard academic philosophical paper, the longing to be scientific (i.e., not literary) accordingly involves overlooking die reader, or making "die reader ontologically weightless, a sort of disembodied professional conscience" (p. 23). Far from trivializing philosophy, Danto's concern for its literary qualities mus aims at revitalizing it. I have been focusing on several essays interested in redefining philosophy as literature. Other essays in this volume move toward seeing literature as in some sense philosophical or at least illuminated by experience with philosophical texts. Denis Dutton's "Why Intentionalism Won't Go Away," Stanley Rosen's "The Limits of Interpretation," and Alexander Nehamas's "Writer, Text, Work, Author" apply philosophy to the dieory of interpretation. In introducing Rosen's essay, Cascardi remarks that contemporary literary theorists have often turned to philosophers such as Gadamer, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and, again, Derrida for guidance in devising an adequate account of interpretation.
Rosen sees this recourse to philosophy as a symptom of "decadence," a sign that for us reading is "no longer a pleasure or an illumination" but a problem that we mistakenly diink die right dieory or mediod will solve (p. I would agree widi Rosen that some recent critics are guilty of relying on philosophy and dieory in diis submissive way but would argue mat there is no going back to the days when a critic like R. S. Crane could count as one of die "crucial facts" in interpretation "die peculiar sequence of emotions we feel when we read die work unbiased by critical doctrine." l No one reads a work unbiased by critical doctrine; extending Lang, I would say no one ever has. Theory is thus here to stay and no appeal to "natural reason" is going to dislodge it. I suspect Rosen would concur: citing Nietzsche, he can call man "the thinking or theorizing animal, the animal who is looking for completeness" (p. 215). But although we cannot steer clear of theory, we need not be helplessly dependent on it, as Dutton and Nehamas in different ways show.
Dutton takes up the question of audiorial intent in interpretation, a dieoretical question if diere ever was one, by which I mean a question mat has tempted literary critics to turn for help to philosophers, often in the hope of establishing once and for all die place of authorial intent in criticism. Discussing questions raised by ironic texts, anachronistic readings, and miscategorized works of art, Dutton argues for die relevance of audiorial intention despite the many different critical meories diat have announced die death, or at least die unknowability, of die aumor. Dutton sensibly concludes that "since words and texts are used by authors for myriad purposes, their intentions will never be found generally irrelevant to some of the interesting and legitimate things that critics may sometimes wish to say about some texts" (p. 206). While I agree with mis to account for construing a text as the product of an action" (p. 281). Not all texts are so construed, but we cannot specify in advance or with certainty what texts will count as literary works, diat is, as works with authors or works that we want to interpret. To put one of Nehamas's own statements a bit differently, interpretation -or assigning a text an authorbegins when interest is stimulated, not when certainty is achieved (see p.
278). As Nehamas points out, the possibility that we might treat a text as having an aumor does not mean that we do. Though not "an independent constraint, forbidding in an a priori manner desired but unlawful interpretations" (p. 289), me author is also not arbitrary. Akhough I endorse diis conclusion, I am most attracted to the appeal to practice supporting it. Nehamas refuses to brand as "arbitrary" everything mat cannot be supported by demonstrative argument. For Nehamas, "to show that a wellestablished practice is arbitrary [here, assigning certain texts aumors and interpreting diem accordingly] entails showing that at least one alternative practice, truly distinct from it, actually exists and makes a claim to being followed. . . . The mere possibility of alternatives never shows that actuality is dispensable" (p. 285).
I would call Nehamas's essay as well as Dutton's "Wittgensteinian" not because diey obsequiously cite Wittgenstein (diey don't) but because diey extend his respect for practice to literary questions. These two essays show how literary dieorists can use philosophy wimout seeking from it the authoritative answers that Rosen rightly suspects. Again to quote Nehamas, "it is a fruitless task, which some might call 'metaphysical' [or philosophical] in a pejorative sense, to try to determine the nature of a discipline independendy of its actual practice and in the hope that this nature will itself determine die practice. We can tell diat a particular text is a work only when we can actually criticize it: which texts are works will depend on what counts as criticism, and what counts as criticism will depend on which texts have been considered as works" (p. 283).
If Dutton and Nehamas thus apply philosophy to literary dieory, the remaining essays in the volume plumb the philosophical dimensions of literary works. Cascardi, in "From the Sublime to the Natural: Romantic Responses to Kant," looks at the romantics' uneasiness wim Kant's guaranteeing knowledge but only on the condition mat we surrender by Hobbes, Peirce, and Heidegger to work out a "theory of constitution.") I like Cascardi's unstated claim mat literary texts think through epistemological and moral questions but I occasionally miss in his essay Frye's sensitivity to die symbolism, imagery and plots-the "literary" dimension -of romanticism. He can say that "the romantic strategy might be thought of as an application of aesmetic experience to die problems generated (and implicitly, left unsolved) by the Critique ofPure Reason7' (p. 106). Such a statement, whatever its odier merits, exaggerates Kant's importance and makes romanticism a more bookish affair than it actually was. Blake, for example, entitled one of his most famous poems Milton (not Kant) and I cannot imagine him "applying" aesthetic experience to anydiing, not even to the failure of the French Revolution, surely as significant an event in romanticism as die Critique. I would agree diat Kant and die French Revolution, even Kant and Blake, have somediing to do with one another. The romantics reacted to Kant, as Cascardi thoroughly shows, but bodi Kant and die romantics responded to historical, personal, and literary pressures diat are sometimes slighted in Cascardi's essay.
Kant also plays a key role in Charles Altieri's "From Expressivist Aesthetics to Expressivist Ernies," which applies contemporary literary theory to a philosophical problem, thus reversing the path taken by Dutton and Nehamas in the essays discussed above. That problem, a legacy of antifoundational diinking, involves aumorizing ediical judgments in the apparent absence of rational, "third-person" standards. Building on his book Act and Quality, Altieri fashions an expressive dieory of literature indebted to Nelson Goodman, Wittgenstein, and Charles Taylor as well as to Kant's aesdietics. Literary experience, as characterized by diis ex338Philosophy and Literature pressive dieory, fills the void left by the collapse of moral universals: in Altieri's words, die arts offer "die most fully articulated models of expression that can connect first-person states to second-order concerns for selfreflexive public identity, concerns mat tie self-interest to obligations involving a range of ideals and cultural exemplars* (p. 136). Even in a volume of adventuresome essays, Altieri's stands out as unusually ambitious. He is not only responding to a central issue in contemporary ethics; he is also criticizing New Historicist literary critics for discussing values and literary works solely in ideological terms. Altieri wants to show mat "the fullest social uses of art have less to do with exposing the historical conditions of dieir genesis than widi clarifying the ways in which they help us understand ourselves as value-creating agents and make possible communities who can assess those creations widiout relying on the categorical terms traditional to moral philosophy" (p. 135). I share Altieri's objectives here, although I think he caricatures the New Historicists who disagree widi him, especially Jerome McGann, whom he hastily accuses of"identifying with a Byronic nihilism as die only authentic way to survive the very history" he embraces (p. 160).
Martha Nussbaum, in "'Finely Aware and Richly Responsible':
Literature and die Moral Imagination," also affirms the importance of literary texts to moral experience. Nussbaum goes so far as to argue that
